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EDITOR'S NOTE: The third annual Law Institute sponsored
jointly by the University of Denver College of Law and the Junior
Bar Sections of the Colorado and Denver Bar Associations was
held in Denver, April 17 to May 3, 1951, and was devoted to the
subject of Civil Trial Techniques in Colorado District Courts.
Abbreviated versions of the institute were later presented in Grand
Junction and in Pueblo, Colorado. All sessions met with capacity
attendance and the program was so universally acclaimed that the
editor of Dicta felt it necessary to perpetuate the record and to
make available to all of the attorneys of the state the valuable
information developed for this Institute on Trial Techniques.
Therefore the eight featured speakers of the Institute were re-
quested to prepare articles outlining the material so ably presented
by them in their previous speeches. The first five of these articles
are presented in the following pages. The remaining three articles
will be presented in the November issue of Dicta.
PRELIMINARY PREPARATION OF
PLAINTIFF'S CASE
By IRA C. ROTHGERBER, JR.,
of the Denver Bar
It is impossible to isolate the preliminary preparation from
the perspective view of the entire case. The well planned Civil
Action is not vastly different from the well planned military opera-
tion, and for purposes of illustration, the analogy between the two
will be preserved.
The first phase of preparation is the marshaling of facts. Al-
though the automobile accident has been assigned as the typical
case, it doesn't present wide enough scope for thorough discussion,
but we will first consider this type of action.
John Plaintiff is generally familiar with the ordinances and
statutes; he has passed a driver's examination; he reads the
newspapers; and he has had friends who have recovered monu-
mental compensation for relatively minor injuries. He will tell
you exactly what happened, conditioned on his experience and
learning. Thus so you start with John's distorted view of the facts,
designed to make his conduct accord with his distorted view of
the law. The General leading his troops into battle must first know
his own strength. Don't depend on your client's version if you
can possibly help it. Cross examine him and recross examine him.
Let him write his version of the facts. Compare his writing with
his recitation of the facts the next time you see him and each time
after that. I don't know what device can make the client tell all.
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Perhaps sodium pentothal will do it, but lawyers aren't licensed
to administer it. I reiterate that we must use vigilant examination
and cross examination.
In the case of auto accidents, and in some other cases, official
reports are available and should be examined. If it is possible,
you should view the site of the accident, and if that is impossible,
photographs and surveys enabling you (and eventually the jury)
to visualize the site should be obtained and examined.
All known witnesses should be interrogated and, if possible,
their signed statements should be obtained. If the witness is re-
luctant to sign a statement, a reporter, preferably a certified re-
porter, should be present to transcribe the statement. Among the
important questions to ask other known witnesses is whether or
not they know of other witnesses to the occurrence. Of course the
client, official reports and the pretrial conference should not be
overlooked as clues to the identity of witnesses. Just as the careful
General knows every inch of his terrain, the careful plaintiff's
attorney has examined every witness.
TAKE DEPOSITIONS EARLY
The modern devices of discovery are generally thought to be
designed for the help of the defendant. Not so. The plaintiff may
examine the adverse party, and, in my opinion, this should be
done at the earliest possible moment. There is a respectable line
of Federal Court decisions holding that the party first requesting
discovery shall be the first party permitted to examine. The Judge
is granted discretion, but this is the guiding rule. A sound Field
Commander ascertains his enemy's strength and weakness as soon
as possible. A sound plaintiff's lawyer may make his comparable
task easier by serving a notice to take the deposition of the de-
fendant concurrently with serving summons. This is a two edged
sword. It may prevent defendant's counsel from racking John
Plaintiff first, and it may give basis for amendment of pleadings,
changing the battle plan or retreating gracefully and cheaply. It
also permits plaintiff's counsel quickly to identify those other wit-
nesses known to the defendant, for it has been held, although not
universally, that such inquiry is permissible.
A word departing from automobile accidents, but an impor-
tant one. As Al Smith frequently proclaimed, "look at the record."
For goodness sake, try to pry. Ask John Plaintiff to furnish you
every word that has been written. If books of account are or
could be involved, examine them until you understand them. If
necessary, go over them with an accountant, and be prepared to
prove their meaning to the trial tribunal. Be certain that you are
able to reconcile all books of account with income tax returns filed
by your client. Understand every record. Assail it until you know
its validity. A good advocate never permits himself to believe any-




Return for a moment to the automobile accident. At the time
you first consider bringing the action, expert witnesses, if any,
should be interviewed so that you know and understand what they
will say. A mere written statement using technical terms can prove
perilous for you. Be able to translate technical language into lay
terms. On the other hand, make certain that the expert can talk
in lay terms.
In closing this phase of the discussion, let me bridge the gap
between facts and law by reminding you that some of the legal pre-
sumptions can be very helpful to you. In preparing a case, it is
wise to review the list of presumptions and to make note of each,
whether they are in support of your position or not.
In the automobile case the study of the law is frequently tedi-
ous but rarely difficult. I cannot prescribe a panacea making legal
research pleasant, but I can give a few cautions about the degree of
thoroughness of preparation and some ideas about organization
of material.
THE CAUTIONS ARE THESE:
1. Brief every prase of your case, both substantive and adjec-
tive law. You may ask how you will know what every phase is.
The only answer I know (and it is far from good) is to start by
reading a good text or encyclopedic article. I know of no man who
has practiced so long that he can fail to overlook this phase of
preparation.
2. Do the same thing with respect to your adversary's case.
3. Know the validity of your objections to evidence in advance
of pleading and trial. Many cases are won or lost because of skill-
ful exclusion of the adversary's proof. If you know it before
pleading, you can narrow the issues and that is generally advan-
tageous to the plaintiff. Both judges and juries can be misled by
multiplication of the issues and by obscuring them.
4. If you are on unfamiliar ground concerning burden of
proof, brief every aspect of this element and be fortified with
authority. Incidentally, when there is a question of burden of
proof, I recommend having it clarified at pretrial.
5. A complete set of instructions should be prepared at the
time that the complaint is prepared. More frequently than not,
this is extra work, but it seems to me to permit a better perspec-
tive view.
The material thus organized can be grouped simply in the
automobile accident case. I have recently encountered a series of
cases (Fair Trade enforcement actions) in which my adversary
has asserted ten or twelve different defenses and in which several
cases referred to various points. One of the young men in our office
suggested that I make an outline of the entire problem. He at-
tributed to me the ability to make the outline in logical order.
This was done, and each subject was assigned a main numerical
DICTA
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designation, followed by decimal and subdecimal designations in
the manner of the loose leaf services published by C. C. H., Prentice
Hall and others. Each case was briefed and at the top of each
page the decimal designator and subject head was noted. Cross
indexing was used liberally, and the entire brief was assembled
in loose leaf form, thus permitting the addition of other knowledge
as it was accumulated.
We are now ready to commence the action. We shall assume
compliance with Rule 17 respecting the identity of parties and
their representative capacities. The real difficulty here arises in
connection with the definition of "indispensable parties" as dis-
tinguished from "necessary parties" or "those who ought to be
parties" as those words are used in Rules 19 and 20. No general-
ity can be helpful here. I merely utter caution. If there is need
for quick decisive action, probably anyone who might be liable
should be joined as a defendant. If the purpose of filing the com-
plaint is to obtain settlement, consideration should be given to
letting the defendant introduce third parties defendant. Now that
inclusion and exclusion of parties is no longer fatal, all one can
do is estimate each situation. Sometimes one creates hostility by
joining as a party defendant one who interests are at least partially
identical to the plaintiff's, whereas he might secure cooperation with
the plaintiff if that same person is named by the defendant as a
third party defendant. But as we have previously pointed out,
tri-partite actions tend to obscure issues and confuse the jury;
therefore, from a plaintiff's standpoint, they should generally be re-
jected.
WHAT COURT To USE
One important question is whether or not the plaintiff should
choose the Federal or the State Courts. The criteria are well
known. In the Federal Court, you generally know what Judge
will try your case. In the State Courts, particularly in Denver,
that is not ascertainable in advance of assignment of the case.
In the Federal Court the jury is drawn from throughout the State,
and therefore is supposed to be representative of many points of
view. Of course, the condition of the docket (whether you will be
likely to reach early trial) is a factor to be considered.
Assuming you have chosen the State Court, Rule 98 seems
fairly clear with respect to a choice of venue, but there are areas
of discretion. Again, one cannot generalize. Practical considera-
tion must govern. Among the factors to be considered are popu-
larity of your client with members of the community from which
the jury will be drawn, the convenience of attendance of witnesses
(and their consequent cooperation), the likelihood of a successful
motion to change the place of trial, and, again, the rapidity with
which your case is to be reached. There are but a few types of
action in which the place of trial is mandatory as in the case in
election contests.
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The rules provide that all causes of action may be joined and
it is generally wise to do so. At some stage of the proceedings,
you may have to elect the ones on which you will proceed, but
again, it is wise to be armed with every weapon you can possibly
use. The philosophy of the Rules is to compel settlement of all
controversies between the parties, or arising out of a transaction,
and it has been hinted that the assertion in one action of all
claims the plaintiff has is desirable, if not mandatory. It will be
noted that Rule 13 requires the assertion of all counterclaims.
It is necessary to have clear, concise allegations as to each
element of each cause of action, and to avoid confusion among the
various causes of action. A word of caution here concerning the
statute of limitations; when there is a possibility that they might
apply as a defense, it is wise to break the plaintiff's case into as
many segments as possible.
WHEN To SERVE THE COMPLAINT
Whether to serve the complaint with the summons is again
a tactical matter. Sometimes time limitations prevent service of
the complaint, but generally it is less work and probably more in
accordance with the spirit of justice to serve it at the time the
summons is served. Of course, the case should be docketed within
ten days of service of the summons. Withholding the filing of the
original summons with the service thereon so as to prevent the
defendant from attacking the return (which, unfortunately, some
of our brethren sometimes do as a dilatory procedure) can be
advisable.
The plaintiff's attorney should carefully check the return on
the process, whether service be by sheriff or by private process
server. After all, if there is no jurisdiction, the plaintiff is the
one who falls by the wayside.
In the event the plaintiff invokes the so called extraordinary
remedies (i.e., replevin, attachment and garnishment, injunction
or the so called peremptory writs) it is advisable to serve copies
of everything excepting the bond. Courts are reluctant to entertain
this type of litigation, and that is the reason I advocate going
further than the rules compel.
A discussion of preparation of the plaintiff's case without
reference to consideration of the possibility of counterclaim would
be incomplete. Whenever a client comes to me, particularly in
an automobile case, I try to analyze with the same care and using
the same criteria here discussed, the possibility of successful coun-
terclaim. This includes, of course, the possibility of plaintiff's
counterclaim to a cross claim and plaintiff's counterclaim against
a third party defendant. This analysis helps in concluding whether
my client should be the aggressor. It is not an invariable rule in
lawsuits that he who strikes first has the more enviable position.
As in warfare, advantages shift. Sometimes it pays to be the
Finland instead of the Russia.
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PRELIMINARY WORK BY DEFENDANT'S
COUNSEL
By WILLIAM K. RIS
of the Denver Bar
Much of the initial work done by defendant's counsel will
parallel similar efforts by plaintiff's attorney. It will consist of
marshalling of facts and law, arriving at conclusions concerning
both substantive rights and procedural matters, and making initial
plans of both strategy and tactics in planning the defense.
The first move in determining the facts in any -given situation
is to take a good look at the defendant. Considerable information
will be disclosed by the initial interview with the defendant, at
which time counsel can partially determine whether he, the client,
is sane, reliable, trustworthy, and financially responsible. The
latter element will often be a material fact upon which to base
such fee arrangement as may be mutually agreeable. Ordinarily,
the sooner the fee arrangement is agreed upon, the less misunder-
standing can result concerning the reasonable worth of the services
rendered or to be rendered by counsel.
The client may-be so unstable or unreliable as not to warrant
counsel in accepting employment. It may take time to realize this
situation, but if such is a fact and counsel intends to withdraw
from representing the client, this should be done at the earliest
opportunity. It is not to be overlooked that the tactics to be used
in carrying forth the defense will depend to a substantial extent
upon the nature of the client. For example, in a situation involving
a substantial question as to the liability of the defendant, the de-
fendant's bargaining position in negotiating a settlement may be
greatly enhanced by the taking of the defendant's deposition if he
is an intelligent, level-headed, responsible individual; whereas, a
defendant's settlement position would be prejudiced by the taking
of the deposition of a stupid, opinionated, self-centered client. It
is extremely important to analyze the impression the defendant
will make as a witness not only at the trial but during the taking
of a deposition. It may be necessary on occasion to inquire concern-
ing the character and financial responsibility of the defendant from
other sources such as mutual friends or business acquaintances.
First impressions in the privacy of a lawyer's office do not always
continue through into the public courtroom.
In addition to getting a general appraisal of the client, counsel
will of course listen to the client talk himself out. This often will
include hearing a distorted version of the facts and a complete
misconception of the law. After listening to the client's tale of
woe, an extensive cross-examination of the client is in order to
determine how much of his tale is fact as compared to wishful
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thinking, conclusions, opinions or hearsay. Obtain all documentary
or real evidence which is available from the defendant and, so
far as possible, obtain information concerning the substance of
writings to others (if no copy has been retained) and also details
of oral statements made by the defendant to others, all of which
might be used for impeachment purposes or constitute admissions
against interest. In negligence cases, it is essential to determine
what signed statements may have been given to investigators or
other attorneys before suit was started.
After all possible information has been obtained from the
defendant and thoroughly screened, an appraisal of the case should
be made to determine how much time and expense is justified in
investigating and preparing for trial. It goes without saying
that a $50.00 property damage claim will not stand the time and
expense that can and should be expended on a multi-million dollar
suit concerning rights to oil properties. Counsel in each case must
weigh the varying factors to determine how much time he can
reasonably allocate to the particular case at hand considering the
amount involved and the potential fee which can be charged.
OBTAIN DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
Assuming the case is such as to warrant substantial time
and expense, further investigation will include a search for all
documentary evidence which directly or indirectly will influence
the outcome of the case.
In negligence cases, witnesses will be interviewed and state-
ments obtained from them if possible, a copy of the police report
or state patrol report should be obtained, any potential source of
photographs of the scene of the accident immediately after it
occurred should be developed and pictures secured, and quite often
a neighborhood search from house to house will develop witnesses
who are otherwise unknown. In other types of litigation, full
investigation of all potential witnesses is called for together with
a thorough search for any documentary evidence such as agree-
ments, letters, wills, memorandums, unrecorded deeds or any other
writings depending upon the nature of the case.
In many instances, it has been observed that attorneys expect
the evidence to walk into their offices only to find out at the trial
that they have missed the boat. On many occasions there is only
one way to develop facts and that is by leaving the soft cushion
seat in the office and pounding the pavements to search for and
to interview witnesses or to seek out other evidence. Lawyers are
notorious for being too lazy to leave their offices but in many
instances laxity in investigation will mean the entire difference
between success and failure.
Witnesses who are available to present oral evidence other-
wise unsubstantiated by any writing, should be carefully ques-
tioned to determine exactly which facts they know of their own
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knowledge and therefore would be admissible in evidence. The
competent evidence must be screened from the hearsy and the inad-
missible opinions. These facts should be reduced to writing if at
all possible through use of a question and answer statement or
a narrative statement or a letter or memorandum or other informal
writing. Such a writing should be in such form as to tie down
the witness as to all material details known to that witness. Thus
a question and answer statement can be transcribed and signed
by the witness or the stenographer or reporter will be available
to testify as to the statements made by the witness; a narrative
statement can either be in the handwriting of the witness or be
over his signature. The same is true of a letter or other memo-
randum. The witness should of course always be permitted to
read the document, make any corrections desired, and then be
requested to sign the same. In the case of a narrative statement
or memorandum each page should be signed for identification pur-
poses. Reducing such evidence to writing early in the game col-
lects the information while it is still fresh in the minds of the
witnesses, reduces any later tendency to shade the facts towards
one side or the other and has the salutary effect of keeping the
witness scrupulously honest as he testifies with the knowledge
that such a statement can be used for impeachment purposes.
Especially where trials are delayed due to crowded dockets or for
any other reason, such a statement is invaluable for purposes of
refreshing the recollections months or years after the incident
or transaction occurred which is the subject off tAe action.
MARSHALLING OF LAW
Initially, it is of importance to determine the theory upon
which plaintiff's counsel is proceeding. Having done so, it is nec-
essary to determine whether plaintiff can establish a prima facie
case upon the existing evidence under his particular theory and
it is also necessary to determine what affirmative defenses may be
available to combat such a theory. Under the Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, the courts are supposed to ignore theories according to
certain opinions of the appellate courts. As a general statement
such a theory is fine but as a practical matter it is not. Even
though common law rights of action have been abolished it is still
necessary to resort to particular theories upon which to base a
claim in order for a trial to progress with any degree of order.
Thus in a claim for bodily injury, it is necessary to proceed upon
the basis of negligence or intentional injury. It is also necessary
for the plaintiff to express the theory in the complaint upon which
he is proceeding inasmuch as certain defenses are denominated
affirmative defenses and must be affirmatively pleaded in an an-
swer. For example, contributory negligence must be pleaded af-
firmatively. How can a defendant plead contributory negligence
unless it appears from the plaintiff's complaint that the plaintiff's
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claim is based upon a theory of negligence? Regardless of any
academic approach to the Rules of Civil Procedure, it is still nec-
essary for the plaintiff to set forth a specific theory upofi which
he bases his claim and it is likewise necessary for the defendant
to base his defense upon that same theory.
In marshalling the law, it is of course necessary to know
generally what the facts of the case will be. If the action is a type
of case in which counsel has had some experience, he will prob-
ably proceed to marshall all of his facts and complete his investi-
gation before attempting to brief any law. However if the type
of case is new to counsel (e. g. false imprisonment) counsel will
ordinarily make a preliminary study of that particular subject be-
fore commencing detailed investigation so that he will know what
facts will be important to develop during his investigation. The
final study of the fine points will not be made until completion
of the investigation however. No attempt will be made to present
a course in legal bibliography or how to find the case in point in
two minutes. (Too often this writer has found a fine case in point
two weeks after the case was tried or two weeks after oral argu-
ment before the Supreme Court.)
TACTICAL PROBLEMS
When the defendant was first interviewed, counsel determined
the date when service was made upon the defendant and made
careful note of the return day so that a default will not be entered.
He has then proceeded to investigate the facts and the law to deter-
mine his over-all strategy. Having done so, it is now necessary
to plan the preliminary tactics in defending the case.
Examination of parties plaintiff and defendant named in the
action will be made to determine if the proper persons have been
made parties. If not, appropriate action will be taken under the
pertinent Rules of Civil Procedure to obviate the deficiency.
Attention will be directed to the jurisdiction of the court
over the person of the defendant as well as the subject matter.
If suit is commenced against a person or corporation not other-
wise amenable to the jurisdiction of the court, such as a foreign
corporation not doing business within the State of Colorado or
a non-resident served outside of the State of Colorado, appropriate
action should be taken at the time the first pleading is filed to
challenge the jurisdiction of the court. Although the Rules of Civil
Procedure do not provide for a "special appearance" for testing
the jurisdiction of the court, as a matter of practice a preliminary
motion attacking the jurisdiction is made upon special appearance.
Thus the defendant will file a motion beginning as follows: "Comes
now the defendant above named, appearing specially for the pur-
pose of this motion and for no other purpose, and respectfully
moves the court, etc." This is of course a continuing practice
from the former Code of Civil Procedure under which a general
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appearance waived any objections to the jurisdiction of the court.. Assuming that counsel is of the opinion that the court does
not have jurisdiction over the party defendant, a "Motion to Quash
the Return on the Summons" is the proper pleading to file. Many
attorneys file a Motion to Quash the Summons, but as long as the
summons has been properly issued by the Clerk of the Court or
an attorney, there is no basis for quashing it. The service of the
summons upon a person not subject to the jurisdiction of the
court being void, the Motion to Quash the Return on the Summons
is the proper approach. If such a motion is granted, the action
is dismissed. Assuming that the trial court overrules the motion
to quash, counsel for the defendant finds himself in a dilemma
at the present time. Under the Code practice, if the defendant
continued on with the case after having such a motion overruled,
his continuation was deemed a general appearance and a waiver
of his objections to the jurisdiction of the court. One Colorado
case hints that perhaps such a result is not the same under the
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Wells Aircraft v. Keyser, 118 Colo-
rado 197, 194 Pacific 2nd 326. This case indicates that the ruling
on such a motion is an appealable order but the opinion appears
to be dicta and not strong enough upon which to rely. Another
procedure is to initiate original proceedings in the Supreme Court
in the nature of a Write of Prohibition directed to the trial court.
The Supreme Court has circumscribed the use of such a Writ in
some of its decisions. Until more time elapses and the Supreme
Court has had an opportunity to consider the matter further, it
is impossible to determine with absolute safety what action should
be taken in the event the trial court does overrule a motion to
quash. This writer certainly has no pat answer to the question.
VENUE MAY BE IMPORTANT
Counsel will next consider the question of venue. The rules
of venue are substantially the same under the Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure as under the former Code. Any case over which a Colorado
court has jurisdiction may be commenced in any county in the
State regardless of the residence of the plaintiff, the residence of
the defendant, Where the cause of action accrued, etc. Defendant
has the right to change the venue under certain circumstances,
which right is waived if not claimed at the time the first pleading
is filed. Whether counsel will want to exercise this right to change
the venue depends upon the particular circumstances. For example
an accident may have occurred in an isolated mountain county
between a plaintiff who lives at Kiowa, Colorado, and a defendant
who lives in Limon, Colorado. Plaintiff's counsel may commence
an action in the City and County of Denver and serve the defend-
ant at his residence. Defendant would then have the right to
change the venue to the county where the accident happened or
to the county of his residence. As a matter of convenience how-
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ever he may elect to leave it in the City and County of Denver.
Thus the practical considerations of convenience of all the wit-
nesses and parties may overshadow the right to a change of venue.
In certain instances, a defendant has the right to transfer
the case to the United States District Court. Under a recent change
in the statutes, a new procedure is prescribed for removal to the
United States District Court from a state court. The defendant
must remove the case within twenty days after service of sum-
mons or the right is waived. No longer need a petition be filed
in the State Court, a verified petition for removal being filed di-
rectly with the United States District Court together with a bond,
copies of all pleadings in the State Court, etc. U. S. C. A., Title 28,
Section 1446, contains the present requirements.
Under certain circumstances, a defendant in a State Court
also has the right to commence an interpleader action in the United
States District Court against the plaintiff in the State Court and
any other claimants wherever they may reside in the United States.
Under this particular practice, further prosecution of the State
Court action, may be enjoined by the United States District Court.
See U. S. C. A., Title 28, Sections 1335, 1397, and 2361.
DILATORY MOTIONS
Assuming there is no question concerning jurisdiction, venue,
etc., the first pleading to the complaint must be considered. If the
plaintiff has followed the forms of complaint set forth in the Ap-
pendix to the Rules of Civil Procedure, there is little room for
the use of a Motion to Strike or Motion to Make More Definite
and Certain or Motion to Dismiss. Sometimes one or more of such
motions are filed if investigation of the facts and law has not
been completed by the return day. It is seldom that such motions
are argued under such circumstances and less often are they
granted. More and more, attorneys are filing answers without
going through the preliminary feints of filing motions indiscrimi-
nately. A New York trial attorney recently stated he had not
seen a Motion to Make More Definite in ten years and a federal
judge from Oklahoma stated he had never granted such a motion
since the Rules of Civil Procedure became effective.
Third-Party practice must also-be considered at this stage of
the proceedings. A defendant may obtain leave to join a third
party defendant, ex parte, if done before he files his answer. After
filing an answer, such permission can be obtained only after notice
to the plaintiff. The amendments to the rules which became effec-
tive in August of 1951 make a very substantial change in the third
party practice as it merely permits joinder of a third party de-
fendant who may be liable to the defendant and third-party plain-
tiff for all or part of the plaintiff's claim and does not permit
joinder of a third-party defendant solely upon the ground that he
is or may be liable to the plaintiff directly.
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PLEADINGS, RULES 7 TO 25
By WINSTON S. HOWARD
of the Denver Bar
Proper pleading is an art. It is no less so under the Rules
than under the Code. The difference in the pleadings under the
Rules and under the Code is that under the Code the real object of
pleading was lost sight of. Under the Rules, purpose of pleading,
which is to inform parties of the issues to be tried, is primary.
Rules governing pleadings are found in Rules 7 to 25. They
will be discussed in their order:
RULE 7. There are only three pleadings: *a complaint, an
answer, and a reply. A reply is not required or allowed, except by
order of court. Applications to the court for orders are to be
made by written motion, which can be incorporated in the notice
of hearing of the motion or the notice of application to set the
same for hearing. This Rule is not used enough. It is possible
under it to have the motion and the notice in one document, with
a saving of repetition in several ways. Motions during a hearing
or trial can be made orally, but this is intended to cover the usual
trial motions, such as motions to strike, motions for directed ver-
dict, mistrial, for judgment, etc. Some cases indicate that a motion
made even during a trial, which is not of this kind, should be made
in writing, and, in such evpnt, the requirement of notice would
probably apply.
There is provision made for the submission of a controversy
to a court without pleadings and upon an agreed statement of
facts. This provision is little used, but could provide a ready and
inexpensive means of submitting a simple dispute.
RULE 8. The prime rule of all pleading under the Rules is
stated in the requirement that pleadings set forth "a short and
plain statement of the claim." The principle of this Rule is that
it provides for notice pleading and is, as now well settled, that
it is not necessary to spell out in minute detail the theory of the
action as it was in Code plea4ing. But it is still necessary that the
complaint aver (not allege) facts which, if true, entitle plaintiff
to relief. The "claim" must be set out so that the court can know
what is involved, so that the counsel for the defendant can know
the issues presented, and so that the doctrines of stare decisis
and res judicata can be applied. The elements essential to entitle
the pleader to relief must appear. The pleader must ask for the
relief to which he thinks he is entitled, but it may be done in the
alternative or it may be of several different types. Moreover the
cases hold that the pleader is not bound by the relief prayed for, but
will be granted that to which the facts entitle him.
Defenses are required to set forth likewise in "short and plain
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terms." If the pleader is without knowledge or information suffi-
cient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, a statement
to that effect is a denial of the averment. Pleaders are required
by the Rule to admit all matters averred in the complaint which
in good faith the pleader does not intend to controvert. And the
obligations of Rule 11 relating to the good faith of the pleader
are specifically made to apply to answers.
The pleadings, as clarified, abridged, or enlarged at the pre-
trial conference and as amended to fit the proof under Rule 15,
must set forth a claim and must controvert the claims made and
thus define the issues to be be tried. It is upon these issues so
defined that the decision of the court or jury is to be had, and it
is these pleadings and pre-trial orders to which one must look to
decide the issues which were determined. Pleadings are still im-
portant.
It is suggested that the avoidance of the phrase "cause of
action" and, instead, the use of the word "claim" will be helpful
in keeping in mind the distinction which now exists. There is
no longer a "cause of action". This is true, even though the
Supreme Court sometimes talks of "causes of actions" in dis-
cussing the sufficiency of complaints under the Rules.
Subsection (c) requires that affirmative defenses be set forth
in pleading to a preceding pleading. In addition to the affirmative
defenses set forth in the Rule, it has been held that last clear
chance, laches, mitigation of damages, statute of frauds, and lien
waiver must be affirmatively pleaded.
I think that, in order to be safe, a plaintiff should secure an
order permitting him to reply if he wishes to raise any affirmative
defense to a matter set forth in the defendant's answer. Rule
7 (d) states that averments in a pleading to which no responsive
pleading is "required or permitted" are taken as denied or avoided.
It does not seem to me that a reply setting up an affirmative de-
fense is required by 7 (c). Rule 12 (b) seems to carry that idea
forward in providing that defenses "shall be asserted in the re-
sponsive pleading thereto if one is required." But our Supreme
Court has in three cases cast doubt on this point. (See Trustee
Co. v. Bresnahan, 119 Colo. 311; Markley v. Hilkey Bros., 113
Colo. 562; Rice v. Farmers State Bank, 221 P. (2) 378.)
The averments of pleadings are required to be simple, con-
cise, and direct. If the pleader is without direct knowledge of
the fact, averments may be made upon information and belief;
and it is sufficient if it is said, "upon information and belief,"
and then set out the fact. It is not necessary that pleadings set
forth ultimate facts, but they may include conclusions of law.
Neither claims nor defenses need to be consistent one with another.
RULE 9. It is no longer necessary to aver capacity or authority
of one suing in a representative capacity or the legal existence
of organized associations. So, an executor need not set forth his
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right to bring suit or defend, nor need the incorporation of a cor-
poration be averred.
An averment that all conditions precedent have been performed
or have occurred is sufficient. A denial of such an averment of
performance must be with particularity, and the burden of proof
is upon the party pleading performance. It is not upon the one
averring with particularity that a performance has not been made.
I am not sure just how this works in practice. Apparently the
one pleading performance would be obliged to establish perform-
ance in the particulars denied, but not otherwise. Provision re-
lating to burden of proof is not found in the Federal Rules, and
there does not appear to have been any State court construction
of it.
A requirement of some importance is that of 9 (g), which
is that items of special damage must be specifically stated. It has
frequently been held that this can be compelled by a motion under
Rule 12 (e). The other provisions of the Rule are clear and cover
special situations.
RULE 10. Rule 10 relates to the names of the parties and in
(b) requires the numbering of paragraphs. This is not always
done, but should be, because the Rule provides that a paragraph
may be referred to by number in all succeeding pleadings, which
is a great convenience. It is a requirement that each claim founded
upon a separate transaction or occurrence and each defense shall
be stated in a separate count or defense. The practice seems to
be to designate such separated claims as "First Claim, Second
Claim, etc.," rather than as "First Count, Second Count, etc."
The Rule allows the accepted practice of adopting parts of a plead-
ing by reference in the same pleading, in other pleadings, or in
motions. It also makes an exhibit to a pleading a part thereof
for all purposes.
RULE 11. Rule 11 is important in that it makes the signature
of an attorney to a pleading a certificate by him that he has read
the pleading, that there is good ground to support it, and that it
is not interposed for delay. The Rule is not as broad as it ought
to be, because seldom are pleadings interposed for delay, but, quite
often, motions are.
RULE 12. Rule 12 is an important rule. It provides that de-
fenses and objections may be presented by the responsive plead-
ing if one is required. Since a motion is not a pleading, the Rule
provides that certain defenses may be presented by motion. They
include: insufficient or improper venue, service or process or lack
or jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim or to join an indis-
pensable party. All such motions available must be made together
and before pleading. Otherwise, they are waived, except that fail-
ure to state a claim may be raised at almost any stage of the pro-
ceedings. Filing any such motion changes the time for filing a
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responsive pleading. It should be noted that it is only the motions
permitted by Rule 12 that have such effect. For example, a motion
for a physical examination does not change the pleading time.
It is not required that any of the defenses set out in Rule 12
must be presented by motion. They may be all joined together
in the responsive pleading without waiver of any of them. But
if any of the objections, except that of failure to state a claim,
is made the subject of a motion, then such objections as are not
included within the motion are waived and cannot be raised by
pleading. This is requisite, because some objections must be made
on the ground that the responsive pleading cannot be prepared
without the information required. Therefore, such objection must
be available by motion. But if the pleading is prepared and filed
without this information, it would, of course, be absurd to have
such a motion included in the responsive pleading. Many pleaders
include in their responsive pleading a motion raising the point
of failure to state a claim, even though that same point has been
made and ruled upon adversely by motion.
Provision is made for what amounts in effect to a speaking
motion, in which, if the court sees fit, matters outside of the
pleading may be presented and considered. In such event, the
motion is considered to be a motion for summary judgment with
all the incidents thereof.
A motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint fails to
state a claim raises the question of the legal sufficiency of the
complaint. To withstand such attack, the complaint must set forth
facts, together with legal conclusions if desired, which facts, if
taken as true, together with the correctly stated legal conclusions,
would entitle the pleader to some relief. Though no case has been
found, it seems that this statement must necessarily be true and
that not only the facts, but the legal conclusions, must be favor-
ably considered in determining the quality of the complaint.
Some Federal cases have held that a motion to dismiss a
complaint for insufficiency must set out wherein the pleading is
defective. This is based on the requirement of Rule 7 that motions
"shall state with particularity the grounds thereof." There seems
to me to be merit in this position, and certainly it would save
counsel much time and labor in preparing for argument in opposi-
tion to such a motion if the court were to require the particular
grounds to be made known.
The Rule provides that a motion for a separate statement
or bill of particulars may be filed. The motion for separate state-
ment and for bill of particulars has been eliminated from the
Federal Rules, though still retained in the State Rules. The office
of this motion is most doubtful, in view of the discovery provisions
of the Rules. If the requirement were adhered to that the motion
shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired,
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the motion would seldom be used. Its chief present use probably
is a dilatory one.
Note that a responsive pleading to which no motion under
12 (b) is available may be attacked for insufficiency by a motion
to strike under this Rule. Thus an answer or a reply may be at-
tacked for insufficiency.
RULE 13. Rule 13 relates to counterclaims and cross-claims.
These are divided into two catagories: permissive and compulsory.
And any claim arising out of the transaction which is the subject
of the complaint must be pleaded or is waived. The recent amend-
ment excepts counterclaims which were the subject of a pending
action at the time the suit was begun. Other claims may, at the
pleader's option, be pleaded. A counterclaim, of course, is a claim
set up by a defendant against a plaintiff. A cross-claim is a claim
set up by one party against a co-party (i.e., plaintiff against plain-
tiff or defendant against defendant). Cross-claims are entirely per-
missive. They must, however, either arise out of the transaction
which is the subject of the original action or relate to property
which is the subject of the action. They may be contingent in that
they may depend on the liability of the party to his opposing
party, which liability is to be determined in the action. So de-
fendant C may cross-claim against defendant D on the ground
that, if defendant C is liable to plaintiff, defendant D is liable to
defendant C for all or part of such claim.
Additional parties may be brought in, if necessary, to a de-
termination of a counterclaim or a cross-claim, and separate judg-
ments can be rendered.
RULE 14. Rule 14 relates to third party practice. This is de-
signed to permit complete disposition of a controversy between
several parties whose rights and liabilities are bound up in the
transaction, but which may vary between the parties.
The procedure is made clear from the amended Rule. If a
defendant considers another non-party to be liable to him for all
or part of any claim asserted by the plaintiff against him, that
defendant may bring into the case such other person and make him
a third party defendant. This can, also, be done by the third party
defendant bringing in another whom he, in turn, considers to be
liable for any claim established against such defendant. Third
party defendants can assert against the original plaintiff any
claims they may have arising out of the transaction, as well as
any defenses the third party plaintiff may have against the plain-
tiff's claim. Also, plaintiff may assert against third party de-
fendants any claims he may have against them. Thus, the ultimate
liable person is determined in one action.
RULE 15. Rule 15 relates to the amendment and supplement
to pleadings. It is a principle of the Rules that the issues pre-
sented by the pleadings, as affected by the pre-trial conference,
shall be the ones tried.
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Amendments or supplements to pleadings are allowed freely.
When parties have, by express or implied consent, tried issues
not raised by the pleadings or set up at the pre-trial, this Rule
provides for amendment of the pleadings to include such issues.
The answer to the question as to whether the unpleaded issue was
or was not tried by implied consent must depend upon the facts
of each case. It must, it seems, appear clearly that such unpleaded
issue was recognized by the court and parties and presented by
evidence deliberately included for the purpose of supporting or
denying that issue. It is certainly not within the intention of
this Rule that evidence not so introduced should be considered
as bearing upon an unpleaded issue to which it accidentally re-
lates. Provision is made for supplementing pleadings to set forth
transactions or occurrences or events happening since the filing
of the pleadings.
RULE 16. Rule 16 provides for pre-trial procedure. Much has
been said in favor of, and something has been said in opposition
to, pre-trial procedures. I am convinced that its merits are great
and its faults are minor. It seems to me that no case of any im-
portance should be tried until after a pre-trial conference has
been held. Pre-trial should be held after all pleadings are closed,
after the discovery procedures have been utilized, and at the time
when a trial date is about to ,be set. The court should not view
pre-trial as a perfunctory procedure to be gotten over as quickly
as possible, but as a valuable time- and expense-saving device.
Counsel should be encouraged to eliminate issues upon which no
real difference exists, to admit authenticity of documents, and to
identify proposed exhibits. Pre-trial orders should be prepared
by the court, and not by counsel, and should set forth the matters
determined at pre-trial. A proper use of pre-trial has been proved
to be- a means of saving a tremendous amount of time, effort, and
expense in the trial. Properly used, it should be a further means
of avoiding surprise at the trial.
RULE 17. "Parties Plaintiff and Defendant" is the subject of
Rule 17, which is substantially the same as under the Code.
RULE 18. Rule 18 makes it clear that a party may join in an
action as many claims as he has against another party. They do
not need to have arisen out of the same transaction or be in any
way related. All controversies between the parties may thus be
settled in one action. Further, a party need not prosecute one claim
to conclusion before proceeding upon a claiim based upon the prior
claim. So, a claim need not be reduced to judgment before an
action is brought to set aside a conveyance averred to be fraudulent.
RULE 19. Rule 19 is intended again to facilitate the full settle-
ment in one action of an entire controversy; so, parties having a
joint interest are (subject to Rule 23) made indispensable parties,
for the Rule says that they "shall" be made parties. "Desirable"
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or "proper" parties are those who ought to be joined if complete
relief is to be accorded between those already parties. They are
to be joined if feasible. If a person who should be a plaintiff de-
clines to join, he may be made a defendant; or, "in a proper case,"
he may be made an involuntary plaintiff. Such a proper case might
be where A is one of a group who are benefited by an agreement
made by X with Y; X declines to enforce the contract against Y,
which it is in A's interests to enforce. I think A could commence
an action against Y, joining X as an involuntary plaintiff.
RULE 20. Rule 20 permits joinder of all persons as plaintiff
or defendant if they assert or have asserted against them "any
right to relief jointly, severally, or arising out of the same trans-
action, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if
any question of law or fact common to all of them will arise in
any action." It is not necessary that any plaintiff or any defendant
be interested in all of the relief demanded. Judgment may be given
for such plaintiffs against such defendants as the proof requires.
Separate trials may be had. It is possible, under this Rule, to
sue joint or several obligees jointly or severally.
RULE 21. Rule 21 relates to misjoinder and non-joinder of
parties. Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal. Mis-
joinder, of course, is the inclusion of an improper person as a
party. Under Rule 19, failure to join an indispensable party would
appear to be ground for dismissal.
RULE 22. Rule 22 provides the procedure relating to inter-
pleading. There is little change from that provided by the Code.
Coming from the Federal Interpleader Statute, the Rule is short
and clear and requires no comment.
RULE 23. The rule relating to class actions, as set forth in
Rule 23, is substantially a restatement of the Code provision. Note
that it is provided in (b), relating to representative suits, that
such an action can now be maintained only by one who was a
shareholder at the time the transaction complained of occurred
or whose share devolved upon him by operation of law.
RULE 24. Rule 24 relates to intervention and provides for
permissive and mandatory intervention. The recent amendments
have enlarged the area of permissive intervention, particularly in
that changes have been made to permit the intervention of govern-
mental officers or agencies in proper cases.
RULE 25. The provisions of Rule 25 for substitution of parties
is clear and little used. It brings nothing new into the practice
beyond the provision for dismissal of the action as to a deceased
party if substitution is not timely made.




RULES 26 TO 37
By PHILIP S. VAN CISE
of the Denver Bar
On May 17, 1951, the Colorado Supreme Court adopted the
recommendations made by its Rules Committee on September 1,
1948, and made 37 amendments to conform to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure as amended, two amendments to the Appendix of
Forms and nine other amendments. These became effective August
17, and have been printed in Dicta. They should be carefully
studied by bench and bar, as they are excellent changes which will
help the practice in the courts.
GENERAL DEPOSITION PROCEDURE
Initially every lawyer should be most careful to be truthful
and honest with the court and fellow lawyers and to accommodate
opposing counsel whenever possible.
Before taking depositions, unless there is an emergency,
counsel should get every possible fact that will affect his case.
He should talk over the matter first with his client, get the names
of all possible witnesses, and see them. If real or personal property
is involved, he should inspect it, check it thoroughly, get the names
of adverse witnesses, and, if not hostile, talk to them. Then counsel
is prepared to take depositions.
We wrote an article for the June, 1951, Rocky Mountain Law
Review based on opinions of the judges and members of the bar
as to the new Rules. The Judges generally commented that too
many lawyers come to court half prepared. The same is true at
the taking of depositions.
We recently took the deposition in a divorce case of a woman
who had gone to Florida in her car with her boy friend, and lived
there some three months openly and notorously as his wife.
After her return to Denver we took her deposition. Her attorney
had had no talk of any kind with her about her conduct or what
she had been doing in Florida prior to the deposition. We inter-
rogated her about the Florida trip and all she would admit was
that she was in Florida and the number of her post office box.
She committed perjury on practically every other question. When
the deposition was concluded we stated in the record of the court
reporter that she had committed perjury and we had the conclusive
evidence as to that fact.
We asked her attorney to stay after the deposition was con-
cluded and gave him the detective's reports, and his answer was
"Why, I never ask my client or witness anything about what they
are going to testify to before their deposition is taken." If he had
done so, he then should have refused to allow her to answer ques-
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tions which would have incriminated her, thus preventing her from
committing perjury. He, however, did not further contest the
case. But he should have been prepared on his facts.
We recommend that depositions be taken as soon as the facts
are known. Sometimes it may be necessary to take depositions
before the complaint is filed. This would be in a case where a
party was critically ill or about to leave the state, and you do not
know all the facts for your complaint. In such event you must
first file the case with the clerk and have him issue the summons.
Then all depends on the adverse party; if he is willing to co-
operate you can take the deposition quickly but it must be done
within ten days, as Rule 3 requires that the complaint be filed
within that period after the summons is served, or the action may
be dismissed. If necessary a skeleton complaint can be filed, then
file an amended complaint after the deposition is taken. This can
be done at any time within 20 days after-the original complaint
is filed if no responsive pleading has been filed in the meantime,
otherwise on order of court. As a rule in cases of emergency
adverse counsel will co-operate.
We make it a rule in all cases which will be contested to take
the deposition of the adverse party, and if the adverse party's
attorney is smart he will not delay the taking of the deposition of
his client, because, the longer the time before the deposition is
taken, the better prepared will be the lawyer who desires to take
the deposition.
WHEN WITNESS WILL NOT TALK
Some attorneys are a little confused as to the procedure in
case a witness refuses to answer questions and threaten to cite
him for contempt of court. There is no contempt of court in re-
fusing to give a deposition or answer questions thereat. The
procedure is to certify up the portions of the deposition, which
would show the refusal to answer, with a motion to the court to
require the witness to answer those questions and others which may
be pertinent. If the court orders the witness to answer the ques-
tions and complete the depositions, and he refuses so to do, he is
then in contempt, and a citation therefor will be issued by the
court under Rule 37.
The witness can be examined on direct, then cross-examined,
re-examined and finally on re-direct, the same as at trial. However,
we seldom interrogate our client if called by the adverse party, and
do not do so unless he has been mistaken in some answer he made
or if an answer needs clarification. Do not open up holes for the
other side.
The great majority of the lawyers and the judges still fail to
abide by Rule 43 (b) and call the adversary for "cross-examination
under the statute". That statute is repealed by the Rules and now
you call the adversary "As an adverse party by leading questions."
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It is best to let the witness tell his story in his own words
without interruption until he finishes, for instance in a divorce
case on the grounds of cruelty, ask the following questions:
"When, where and what was the first act of cruelty? Give
all the facts about it."
Then ask questions to clarify.
Do not use contradictory evidence at this time; reserve it for
trial, get his story in his own words.
Then get the next act of cruelty and continue to interrogate
the witness as to every possible phase of the case.
If he is your witness set him at ease, let him smoke and
relax. Do not interrogate too fast and remember to take rests
for the court reporter.
If the witness desires to refer to a memorandum or book, let
him do so but be sure to identify it in the record.
When you get to the end of a deposition ask the witness if
there is anything else about the case about which he has not been
interrogated that he wants to state, that you want the full facts
from him.
If he is your client or one of the witnesses whom you expect
to use at the trial, watch him very closely for accuracy. You can,
if advisable, object to any question if privileged or incriminatory
or if the question has nothing to do with the case in any manner
whatsoever, and instruct him not to answer.
QUESTIONS ASKED AT THE INSTITUTES
Quite a number of questions were asked the committee at
some of the Institutes and we will now answer the ones that are
pertinent to these sections of Rules.
1. Q. "Is a notice to a party's attorney sufficient to compel
the party's attendance for deposition or must a subpoena be
served ?"
A. Rule 5 provides among other things that every written
notice, appearance, demand and similar paper must be served on
each of the adverse parties, and that this service shall be made
upon the attorney for the adversary if he has one. This, of course,
could refer only to the adverse party, as to all other witnesses
subpoenaes must be served.
2. Q. "If documents are desired must a subpoena duces tecum
be issued or is a demand for documents incorporated in the Notice
to Take Deposition sufficient?"
A. The demand should be sufficient but it depends upon the
adverse lawyer. If he is courteous and cooperative he will pro-
duce them; if he is not he may refuse to do so, and you will save
time by issuing subpoena.
3. Q. "If a party does not appear in response to a notice to




A. Thereafter deal with that discourteous attorney at arms
length. Issue and serve a subpoena forthwith and set a new date.
4. Q. "Can depositions be taken of witnesses other than a
party in a county other than that in which the witness resides?"
A. "No." See Rule 45 (c) (2). Of course if the witness is
willing to appear and the other side agrees it can be taken any
place. However, the testimony of the plaintiff can be taken in the
county in which the case is filed, and the defendant in that county
if he has been served within the State or has appeared. See 4
Federal Rules Decisions, page 474 for an excellent brief on this
requirement that the plaintiff may be made to appear, even though
he lives in another State.
5. Q. "Can a party to a civil action refuse to testify at his
deposition on the grounds that his "testimony may incriminate
him?"
A. The answer is "yes", but he does so at his peril because
it will prejudice him to the court or a jury.
6. Q. "If so can he thereafter testify at the trial on his own
motion in this respect?"
A. "Yes" but he can be impeached by reading to him his
prior refusal to answer at the time of the deposition. See address
No. 8 by a member of the Rules Committee in the Colorado Rules
of Civil Procedure, Page 480.
7. Q. "May a defendant's deposition be taken before answer
is due?"
A. "Yes" under Rule 30 in the Colorado Courts. In the U. S.
Court under Rule 26 only by leave of court.
8. Q. "When a statement has been given by a party prior to
the institution of a suit as for instance, statements to claim ad-
justers, can the party who gave the statement force the produc-
tion of the statement itself under the Rules of Discovery?"
A. The answer is "Yes" under Rule 26 (b). See 1 Federal
Rules Digest, pages 414 to 418.
9. Q. "Can the production of documents be demanded before
answer by either the plaintiff or defendant?"
A. "Yes". Depositions may be taken on any matter not priv-
ileged, it may be a fishing expedition, anything that has any pos-
sible bearing on the litigation is proper.
COSTS OF TAKING DEPOSITIONS
The costs of taking depositions have been pretty generally
awarded by the district courts to the successful party, however,
in a decision of the Supreme Court of June 25, 1951, Morris vs.
Redak, the Supreme Court reversed the Denver District Court as
to that part of a judgment which covered the costs of taking
depositions of witnesses who were present at the trial. Rule 16
of the Denver District Court provided "whether depositions or any
parts thereof shall be taxed as costs shall be in the discretion of
the trial court." The Supreme Court held:
DICTA
"There is no provision in our Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure authorizing the assessment, as costs, of steno-
graphic expense incurred in the taking of a deposition
for purposes of discovery. We consider that taking de-
positions of witnesses in preparation for trial is some-
thing in the nature of a luxury, and that one who avails
himself of this procedure does so as his own expense."
While the ruling stands until changed, we do not agree that
depositions are a luxury. We believe that they are a necessity and
that most trial lawyers share this view. We hope the Rules will
soon be amended to allow them to be taxed as costs at the discretion
of the Court.
However, in the United States Courts depositions, in the dis-
cretion of the Court, are generally taxable as costs under Rule
54(d). See citation of authorities in Federal Rules Digest Vol-
ume 1, pages 411 and 412.
RULE 26-DEPOSITIONS PENDING ACTION
Depositions were permitted under the Code of Civil Procedure,
but that did not allow the broad discovery practices under the new
Rules. We have won a great many cases because our depositions
enabled us to contradict the testimony of the adversary. Also,
three or four times, by taking depositions our own case has been
blown up, and we promptly dismissed it. We much prefer to have
a case shown to be without adequate proof in the office rather than
in Court.
Paragraph (b) of this Rule has this Amendment:
"It is not ground for objection that the testimony
will be inadmissible at the trial if the testimony sought
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence."
That admendment fortifies discovery procedure.
This Rule under Section (d) (3) provides when the entire
deposition may be used at the trial. The best way so to do is to
have one of the attorneys for the party using it sit in the witness
box and read the answers to the questions as the other lawyer asks
them. This is much more effective than for the lawyer to read
both questions and answers.
Taking depositions does not waive the objections of the party
taking them to the competency of the witness. And this is so in
will contests under Gottesleben v. Luckenbach.1 Hence there are
no risks in taking the deposition of a party or witness whose testi-
mony would be objected to as incompetent at the trial.
RULE 27-DEPOSITIONS BEFORE ACTION, OR PENDING APPEAL
The procedure on this is so adequately covered in Rule 27,
which sets forth the complete details, that comment on the same
is unnecessary. This Rule is only invoked in very rare cases.
I Supreme Court of Colorado, No. 16465, Advance Sheet No. 15, April 21, 1951.
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RULE 28-PERSONS BEFORE WHOM DEPOSITIONS MAY BE TAKEN
This Rule gives the procedure in detail. Paragraph (a) thereof
is amended by adding the following additional persons within-the
United States before whom a deposition can be taken: "or before
a person appointed by the court in which the action is pending. A
person so appointed has power to administer oaths and take
testimony."
The only portion of this Rule to which we wish to call atten-
tion is paragraph C(c), the capital C throughout the Rules, of
course, means that it is a Colorado and not a Federal Rule. This
paragraph prevents the stenographer for one of the attorneys in
the case from taking the deposition unless the adverse party is
agreeable thereto. The best way to arrange for taking the deposi-
tion is to phone the adverse attorney, have him agree on the place,
time and reporter, then no question can be raised.
We were surprised to find that a few of the District Judges
take depositions, and that one does so at pre-trial conferences. We
believe this is an imposition on the judges and doubt if they have
time so to do except in rare major cases where a witness con-
tinues to refuse to answer questions. It also is not pre-trial pro-
cedure.
CAN DEPOSITIONS BE TAKEN BY WIRE RECORDING?
Rule 80 provides that when the testimony at "a hearing which
was stenographically reported is admissible in evidence at a later
trial, it may be proved by the-transcript thereof duly certified by
the person who reported the testimony."
Under this section one Denver lawyer has refused to attend
a deposition taken by wire recording, and the transcript if not
taken stenographically might be thrown out. This might also apply
to machine typing reporting. To save later trouble have such re-
porting approved by stipulation or don't use it.
RULE 29-STIPULATIONS REGARDING THE TAKING OF DEPOSITIONS
This Rule gives the attorneys power to do almost anything
they will agree upon. An attorney should cooperate in these stip-
ulations so as to expedite matters. It is quite a general practice
to agree that all objections will be waived in the deposition but can
be raised at the trial, including objections as to the time, place
and reporter.
RULE 30-DEPOSITIONS UPON ORAL EXAMINATION
Rule 30(b) has been amended by this addition:
"The provisions hereof shall be liberally construed
by the Court in order to prevent unnecessary inconven-
ience and expense to parties and to witnesses, and to avoid
unnecessary delay."
Paragraph (f) provides that the officer taking the deposition
shall seal the same and file it with the Clerk of the Court in which
the action is pending. To save expense attorneys usually stipulate
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at the deposition that the one who takes the deposition may keep
the original, subject to inspection by his adversary, and that he
will file it with the Clerk of the Court at the time of the trial.
If not so stipulated the one taking the deposition will have to pay
for a copy. Otherwise the original must be filed promtly and
copies paid for.
Any witnesses in the county in which the case is filed can
be required to attend by a subpoena issued by a Notary or the
Clerk unless documentary evidence is demanded, in which case
the Clerk is the only one who can issue it and then it must be
by order of Court.
If the examination becomes improper counsel can state in
the record that he refuses to proceed because of misconduct and
refer it to the court for a decision thereon. He can then move the
court to terminate it under Rule 30.
RULE 31-DEPOSITIONS ON WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES
These are usually taken of witnesses out of the County or out
of the State. Such a witness should be contacted earlier by attor-
ney, if possible, to be sure that he will know the answers to the
questions. It is always desirable to have an attorney for your
client present at the deposition.
Such depositions are usually taken when the cost might be
excessive for an oral examination or if the deposition is short.
RULE 32-EFFECT OF ERRORS IN DEPOSITIONS
This Rule generally provides that most errors in the taking of
a deposition are waived unless prompt objection is made.
RULE 33-ITERROGATORIES To PARTIES
This Rule has been amended to read as follows:
"Any party may serve upon any adverse party writ-
ten interrogatories to be aswered by the party served or,
if the party served is a public or private corporation or a
partnership, association, or body politic, by any officer or
agent 'who shall furnish such information as is available
to the party. The interrogatories shall be answered sep-
arately and fully in writing under oath. The answers
shall be signed by the person making them; and the party
upon whom the interrogatories have been served shall
serve a copy of the answers on the party submitting the
interrogatories within 15 days after the service of the
interrogatories, unless the court, on motion and notice
and for good cause shown, enlarges or shortens the time.
Within 10 days after service of interrogatories a party
may serve written objections thereto. Such objections
shall be determined by the court at the earliest practicable
time. Answers to interrogatories to which objection is
made shall be deferred until the objections are determined.
"Interrogatories may relate to any matters which
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can be inquired into under Rule 26 (b), and the answers
may be used to the same extent as provided in Rule 26(d)
for the use of the deposition of a party. Interrogatories
may be served after a deposition has been taken, and a
deposition may be sought after interrogatories have been
answered, but the court, on motion of the deponent or the
party interrogated, may make such protective order as
justice may require. The number of interrogatories or
of sets of interrogatories to be served is not limited ex-
cept as justice requires to protect the party from annoy-
ance, expense, embarrassment, or oppression. The provi-
sions of Rule 30 (b) are applicable for the protection of the
party from whom answers to interrogatories are sought
under this rule."
The amendments are italicized.
Written interrogatories are served on the adverse party's at-
torney to be answered under oath in 15 days unless the court
enlarges or shortens the time. Objections, however, must be in
writing and served within 10 days. Proceedings are then stayed
until the objections are ruled on by the court.
Only one set of interrogatories may be served on an adverse
party without leave of court. If the client is short of money,
interrogatories may have to be used instead of depositions. In-
terrogatories can be used to advantage if there are only a few
matters to be determined. They must be very carefully worded
so that they unquestionably require the answer desired.
INTERROGATORIES ARE NOT EVIDENCE
Answers to interrogatories are not evidence in the case unless
voluntarily introduced by the interrogator as admissions against
interest on the part of the party interrogated. They do not limit
proof upon trial as different facts may develop after the taking.
Interrogatories may be helpful in taking later depositions of
witnesses by getting the names thereof and data on the documents
which may become material such as their existence, description
and nature, and as to who has their custody.
The court has very wide discretion as to whether or not in-
terrogatories should be answered. Many lawyers make the mistake
of having a tremendous number of interrogatories and it con-
sumes a great deal of time of the court in passing upon them.
They should be relatively few and related to the important facts
of the case.
2
The interrogated party need only answer as to facts within
his knowledge and not give his opinions. He also cannot be re-
quired to search for matters not readily known to him.
Existing photographs can be secured but they cannot be re-
quired to be taken by the adversary.
Conclusions of law and incriminatory matters are barred.
- F. R. D. 411, 2 F. R. D. 199, 4 F. R. D. 210.
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RULE 34-DISCOVERY AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
This Rule has been amended by three clauses tying it to the
provisions of Rule 30(b) and the scope of the examination in
Rule 26 (b).
This Rule should be reread before moving for documents.
RULE 35-PHYSICAL AND MENTAL EXAMINATION
This Rule is very helpful in cases where there will be expert
Medical testimony.
RULE 36-ADMISSION OF FACTS AND DOCUMENTS
This Rule will save a lot of trial time. Many of the judges
require all documents to be produced at pre-trial.
RULE 37-REFUSAL To MAKE DISCOVERY
This Rule contains penalties which the Courts are reluctant
to assess, but in most cases should do so.
JURY SELECTION AND OPENING
STATEMENTS
By DARWIN D. COIT
of the Denver Bar
First consideration should be given to the advisability of
demanding a jury. This depends on many factors including amount
involved, whether problems presented are more legal than factual,
and predisposition by the particular trial Judge as disclosed by the
Judge's rulings in similar cases decided by him. A jury trial takes
longer than a trial to the Court and is more costly. There are more
chances for reversible error in jury trials. In most Courts, trials
to the Court can be obtained faster than jury trials. On disputed
facts and where the quantum of damages is involved, trial Judges
generally prefer jury trials and often order a jury trial although
the parties do not desire one under the Rules, this being discre-
tionary under Rule 39. Where a conflict in the facts is anticipated,
it is important to determine, if possible, whether the factual ideas
of your client and his witnesses can be more readily "sold" to a
Judge or to a jury of persons from different walks of life.
Jurors are put on the panel in Denver by the Jury Commis-
sioner and in other Counties by the County Commissioners. Courts
still have the power under the Statute to select persons for jury
service on an open venire.
1935 C.S.A., Chapter 95, Section 1, as amended in 1945, states
that jurors must be citizens, male or female, age 21 years or over,
who have not been convicted of a felony and who are able to speak
and understand the English language. Theoretically at least, any
person who is put on the panel has the statutory qualifications,
but may be otherwise disqualified.
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Any litigant may have six jurors or twelve jurors to decide
the civil matter. If six jurors have been demanded, more than
fourteen prospective jurors are sent to the courtroom and four-
teen are called by the Clerk to the jury box. Where twelve jurors
have been demanded, more than twenty jurors are sent to the
Court, and intitially the Clerk calls twenty jurors into the box.
The reason for the additional prospective jurors over the fourteen
or the twenty, as the case may be, is that some of the jurors
called into the box may be challenged for cause, and hence re-
placements will be necessary. If none of those called into the box
are challenged for cause, each side would exercise its four peremp-
tory challenges, thus reducing the number in the one case to six
and in the other case to twelve.
SIX JURORS OR TWELVE?
A jury of twelve costs more. It has been argued that the de-
fense should ask for twelve because it is more difficult for a plain-
tiff to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence to twelve
than to six. However, since only four peremptory challenges are
allowed to each side where a jury of twelve is demanded, there is
always a possibility that one side or the other may, after exercising
the peremptory challenges, find that there are acquaintances of
the opposition left unchallenged. Because of the limited challenges,
generally speaking it is better for each side to have a jury of six,
and a jury of six is by far the more prevalent.
After the initial fourteen or twenty, as the case may be, are
called into the box, each side is allowed to make a preliminary
statement, which must not be confused with the opening statement
hereinafter mentioned. The purpose of the preliminary statement
is to advise the prospective jury generally of the controversy, the
time and place where the events are supposed to have occurred
and to identify the parties, prospective witnesses, and the attor-
neys or former attorneys involved. Sometimes the particular trial
Judge will make a preliminary statement and ask some preliminary
questions. The purpose of any preliminary statement, whether
made by the Judge or by counsel, is that it may act as a basis for
questions to be propounded to the jurors touching upon their
qualifications.
QUESTIONING PROSPECTIVE JURORS
It should be stressed that an attorney in questioning has a
splendid opportunity to engage in "idea selling." He can best
achieve the maximum result for himself and his client's cause by
assuming a proper demeanor and by the use of questions proper
both in substance and form. Generally speaking the lawyer should
as briefly as possible interrogate on any subject touching the
juror's probable interest, bias, or prejudice. Any question pro-
pounded should be in such form as not to embarass any prospective
juror. Any questioning should be reasonably rapid and care must
DICTA
Oct., 1951
be taken not to bore the jury. The number of questions, whether
given to the entire jury or to one individually, will depend largely
upon the probable facts in controversy, the participants therein,
upon answers to previous questions, and upon the astuteness of
counsel.
It is impossible in detail to set forth every specific subject
to be explored in questioning a prospective jury. Many times new
questions not anticipated in advance are suggested by the answers
of the prospective juror to previous questions. Specifically, how-
ever, the following matters among others should be explored in
jury questioning:
Acquaintanceship or relationship, directly or indirectly, with
the attorneys, parties, or witnesses involved, or any members of
their respective families or close friends thereof. A juror may
truthfully answer that he does not know the attorney, but on
further questioning it may be determined that while he does not
know the attorney, he has some good friend or relative who has
used the attorney and who thinks highly of him.
Occupation and prior occupations of the juror and of members
of his family and of relatives by marriage. Very often the matter
of occupation is important. For example, a housewife may be on
the jury panel in a case where a truck driver or a trucking com-
pany is involved. Her husband may not work for any truck line,
but may have previously driven trucks; and if so, the husband may
be sympathetic to truck drivers and may have conveyed his notions
thereon to his wife. Under the circumstances she may have an
inclination to favor a truck driver. As an illustration, in a recent
case in Denver a prospective female juror was married to a man
not involved in any trucking operations, but it developed in ques-
tioning that her brother-in-law was a trucker and had, through
family contact, sold her on the idea that truck drivers were so well
trained that if involved in an accident, someone else was always
to blame.
Participation of the prospective juror or members of his
family or close friends in litigation of any kind, but especially in
litigation of the type on trial.
Former jury service of the particular juror. If a prospective
juror has previously acted as a juror on some case involving an
automobile accident, he may be undesirable for either side in
another automobile case because of the differences in the factual
situations and the differences in the instructions.
Prior legal training. It sometimes develops in questioning that
a juror, though not a lawyer, has studied some legal subjects. A
little knowledge is dangerous. A juror with a smattering of legal
knowledge might find it more difficult to follow the Court's in-
structions than a juror who had no prior legal training. In the
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same connection it is probably undesirable to select a juror who
has worked for any law office or been in close association therewith.
Juror's connection, directly or indirectly, with any investiga-
tion agencies. Inquiry under this heading is important in cases
involving tort suits. Persons working for investigation agencies
may have an inclination to look beyond the evidence because of
prior experiences.
Family Status where important.
Insurance. In a suit for damages growing out of an automo-
bile accident question are often asked of a juror as to his connection
with or interest in any liability insurance company. The subject mat-
ter here has been treated under various factual situations by the
courts of last resort in the various states, including Colorado. The
Colorado Supreme Court, in the writer's opinion, has not in its
decisions on the facts before it covered many of the factual situ-
ations which can arise on the questions involved. In practice the
interrogator asks of the jury or a particular juror the so-called
general question or the specific question. The general question is
one to inquire of a particular juror or of the jury as a whole of
his or their connection with any insurance company. The general
question is usually phrased about as follows: "Are you, or is any
member of your family an agent, stockholder, director, or em-
ployee of any insurance company?" The specific question is the
one in which the interrogator inquires about the juror's interest
in a particular named insurance company. Both types of questions
have been used, and the use thereof permitted by appellate courts
on facts before the appellate courts.
Theoretically at least, the Court and all counsel should be
interested in a fair trial. The appellate courts in their probe into
whether certain questions propounded of a jury were proper or
not have been guided probably generally by the ultimate question
as to whether, under all the circumstances, there was a fair trial.
In jurisdictions where the question on insurance interest is al-
lowed in some form, the underlying purpose is not to advise the
jury or the particular juror that the defendant is insured, but
rather to ascertain from the particular juror his connection with
an insurance company on the theory that if he is so connected, or
has been so connected, or if close members of his family have been
so connected, he might be prejudiced in the case one way or the
other. Certainly, no question should be permitted by the Court
which would in effect advise the jury directly or indirectly that
a particular defendant in the case on trial is insured for liability.
Any question which gets that result is improper and should lead
to a mis-trial.
In fairness to all sides, the general question on insurance is
the one that should be asked and not the specific. Only if a par-
ticular juror answers the general question in the affirmative
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should he be asked the name of the insurance company with which
he had or has connections. Certainly, if the general question does
not reveal any interest of the juror in any insurance company,
there would be no reason to interrogate concerning any named
insurance company.
Defense counsel is always prejudiced by objecting to plaintiff's
improper interrogation concerning insurance if he makes his ob-
jection in the presence of the jury. Where there are apparent
grounds for objection or a motion for a mis-trial, a recess should
be declared and the matter taken up in chambers. It seems proper
and highly desirable for the Court at a pretrial conference or at
least immediately before the trial to outline to counsel the general
questions that will be permitted on the insurance matter and the
scope of said questions. If counsel then in questioning transgresses
that scope, it would seem that the Court should immediately grant
a mis-trial without objection from the defense. Actually, the
Courts do not properly supervise the questioning pertaining to
insurance. In many Federal Courts where the Judge himself asks
the questions, the Judge will not ask any questions on the subject
of insurance in damage suits. There is no real reason why any
question should be asked concerning insurance. In questioning
a juror as to his occupation or prior occupations, it can generally
be determined whether he has had any connection with insurance
companies which would make him prejudiced in any case, without
reference by the interrogator to the word "insurance." A different
situation, of course, is presented where an insurance company is
directly sued. Notwithstanding the above, the courts, as afore-
mentioned, have (probably improperly) tolerated questions of
different kinds on the insurance phase.
CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE
Challenges for cause are set forth in Rule 47 of the Rules and
in substance are as follows:
a. Lack of qualifications to sit. This would mean that the
juror did not have the statutory qualifications in that he was not
old enough, was not a citizen, or could not speak or understand
English.
b. Consanguinity or affinity within the third degree of any
party.
c. Standing in relationship of guardian and ward, master
and servant, employer and clerk, principal or agent of either party,
or being a member of the family of any party, or a business part-
ner with any party, or being a surety on a bond or obligation of
any party.
d. Where the prospective juror has been a juror or a witness
in a previous trial between the same parties on the same cause
of action.
e. Where a juror has an interest in the event of the action
or in the main question involved in the action.
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f. Where the juror has formed or expressed an unqualified
opinion or belief as to the merits of the action.
g. The existence of a state of mind in the juror evincing
enmity or bias to either party. Frequently a juror states that he
is well acquainted with a lawyer involved, plays golf with him,
and attends social functions with him, but claims that this would
not influence his decision. His opinion in that regard is generally
accepted by the Court, and the Court will not allow a challenge
for cause. It is necessary in such case to use a peremptory chal-
lenge.
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
Each side has four peremptory challenges which may be exer-
cised at will, and it is not necessary to assign any ground for such
a challenge. Under the Rules, however, if there be more than one
party to a side, the parties on the same side must join in the per-
emptory challenges. This creates a dilemma, and the Rules should
be corrected. Prior to the new Rules, generally speaking there was
one plaintiff and one defendant to a side; however, under the
present Rules of Procedure numerous parties get involved in a
suit and some of them on the defense side of the table have claims
absolutely adverse to one another. Simply put, one defendant
may have a cross-claim against another defendant. As to the
cross-claim, the defendant asserting it is in the same position as a
plaintiff as against his co-defendant. If the plaintiff sues two
defendants, the plaintiff gets four peremptory challenges under
the Rule, but the defendants with hostile positions to one another
are given only four which must be exercised jointly between them.
Where the defendants are adverse to one another, which is often
the case, they are unable to agree on the exercise of the peremptory
challenges. Since the Rule states "they must join," if they refuse
to join there seems to be no power in the Court to compel them.
If one defendant has an adverse position to another defendant and
refuses to join in peremptory challenges, there would be no way
for the trial to proceed because the jury never could be selected,
in which instance the plaintiff could not try his case. The Rule
on jury challenges should be studied and completely modified. It
often happens in a damage suit that a defendant who might have
a cross-claim against the other defendant does not insert it in that
action, but it may be that defendant's contention at the trial is
that he was not negligent and that the other defendant was solely
responsible. The other defendant may take a similar position as
applied to him. In such a situation it would seem that each de-
fendant should be entitled to as many peremptory challenges as
the plaintiff.
The peremptoiry challenges are very important to any party,
and that point has been recognized by trial courts. Recently, when
the problem has been presented to the trial courts, some trial
courts have encouraged stipulations by the parties giving more
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peremptory challenges to each defendant than called for by the
Rule. Certainly, if two hostile defendants cannot agree and thus
join in the exercise of the peremptory challenges, the plaintiff
would either be forced to consent to give each defendant more
peremptory challenges or be prevented from trying his case, be-
cause it would be impossible under the present Rule to select a
jury unless the hostile defendants agreed on the peremptory
challenges.
This subject has not been treated in the recent amendments
and revisions to the Rules. Much time is lost during a trial by a
trial court because of the strong positions that can be taken by
the parties under Rule 47- (h). The writer expresses no final view-
point on how the Rules of Civil Procedure should be amended, but
certainly something should be done to clarify the various situations
that can occur because of the numerous parties, claims, cross-
claims, counter-claims, etc., allowed under the Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure.
OPENING STATEMENTS OF COUNSEL
The purpose of an opening statement is to advise the jury of
the client's theory of the case and of the anticipated evidence to
support that theory. In an opening statement counsel has a further
opportunity at that stage to "sell" to the fact-finding body the
factual ideas to be supported by the evidence later. The opening
statement is an important step in the jury trial. If a lawyer uses
the opening statement for the purpose for which it was intended,
the statement can be of great value to the jury as well as to his
client's cause. It is meaningless to make an opening statement
which in effect gives to the jury a digest of the issues made by the
''postcard" pleadings now allowed under the Rules of Procedure.
It would seem proper and highly beneficial to advise the jury in
an opening statement in some reasonable detail what the case is
about and what the evidence will show to support the theories.
It is highly improper for counsel in an opening statement to
advise the jury in substance as to what some particular witness
is going to say when he knows, or ought to know, that the witness
will not be available or where there is doubt as to the availability.
It is improper to mention any evidence to be revealed later where
counsel knows, or ought to know, that said evidence if offered
will be inadmissible, or to mention it where he knows, or ought
to know, that there is extreme doubt as to its admissibility. It is
improper for any counsel in an opening statement to indicate
to the jury that he is going to ask for certain rulings by the Court
where he knows that the request to be made by him, if he in fact
so intends, would have to be made in the absence of the jury.
It is improper for any lawyer in an opening statement to give his
private opinions as to the merits. There have been instances
where a lawyer with a weak case has in an opening statement made
complete statements of fact when later as it turned out there was
Oct., 1951 DICTA
Oct., 1951
no evidence in the record to support such statements. In many of
those instances the lawyer should have known that he would have
no such evidence. Such practice should not be tolerated, because
the counsel involved is not behaving with candor and fairness.
Undoubtedly it is true that a fact-finding body often gets con-
fused about what it hears in the statements of counsel as distin-
guished from what it hears from the witness stand.
Astute trial counsel often has the Court Reporter transcribe
the opening statement of the opposition. This can be of material
benefit later on a closing argument where the oposing counsel
has made wild assertions in his opening statement. Many Re-
porters do not record the opening statements unless specifically
asked. Why this is true is not known, because an opening statement
is a part of a trial to the same extent as any part, and cases have
been reversed because of improper opening statements.
It must always be remembered that an improper opening state-
ment, as well as any other improper conduct in a trial on the part
of counsel, might lead to a mis-trial, a nullification of any verdict
obtained, and in some cases disclipinary action for unethical con-
duct.
A good rule for an attorney to follow in making an opening
statement, or in handling any other phase of a jury trial, is never
to resort to any means or conduct which he would not honestly
expect and desire the opposition to employ against him under the
same circumstances.
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TAXATION
BY ALBERT J. GOULD AND KENNETH L. SMITH
of the Denver Bar
INVOLUNTARY CONVERSION OF PROPERTY
On August 20, H. R. 3590 was passed by the Senate amending
Section 112(f) relieving owners of property involuntarily con-
verted of the troublesome requirement of tracing the proceeds from
the converted property into the replacement property. The pend-
ing bill will make it possible for taxpayers to purchase replace-
ment property before receiving the proceeds from the converted
property. The bill will also relieve the hardship caused by the
holding in the Ovider Realty Co. (Dicta, August, 1951) in which
part of the proceeds from converted property used to pay off
indebtedness on the converted property was taxed.
SPLITTING A BUSINESS INTO Two OR MORE CORPORATIONS
In view. of the modern tendency of splitting a business into
various corporations, resulting in an excess profit tax credit for
each corporation, the application of Section 45 is significant.
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Section 45 provides: "In any case of two or more organiza-
tions, trades, or businesses (whether or not incorporated, whether
or not organized in the United States, and whether or not affili-
ated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same in-
terests, the Commissioner is authorized to distribute, apportion,
or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances be-
tween or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he
determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is
necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect
the income of any of such organization, trades, or businesses."
Even though the regulations under Section 45 state that the
purpose of the Section is not to effect a result equivalent to a
computation of consolidated net income under Section 141, the
Commissioner has contended that Section 45 should apply where
several organizations are under common control. In the case of
Grenada Industries, Inc., 17 T. C. No. 28, four organizations were
owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests,
but the Court holds that the allocation of the income of one to
another was arbitrary and not authorized under Section 45 (ex-
cept in one instance). The Court held that despite the intertwin-
ing relationships, one company paid and received fair market
prices as though its transactions had been carried on with strang-
ers and, the Court stated, "No more could be expected of it".
The Court further stated: "The purpose of Section 45 is not
to punish the mere existence of common control or ownership but
to assist in preventing distortion of income and evasion of taxes
through the exercise of that control or ownership. It is where
there is a shift or deflection of income from one controlled unit to
another that the Commissioner is authorized under Section 45 to
act to right the balance and to keep tax collections unimpaired".
The proposed Revenue Act of 1951, passed by the House and
now in the Senate, provides among other things that there shall
be only one excess profit tax credit allotted to a group of corpora-
tions having a designated common ownership. The details of this
act have not been resolved and it is not determined what percentage
of ownership will apply.
NEGLIGENCE AND RESPONSIBILITY
IN RESCUE CASES'
FRANCIS K. RISKO and MAXIM E. EHRLICH *
"As a consequence of the high regard for human life which
is prevalent in all civilized societies, it has become a well settled
principle of our law that the rigor of the rules incident to the doc-
trine of contributory negligence will be relaxed in favor of one
who sacrifices himself in the rescue of a fellow man in distress."
'2
This article deals only with rescue of persons.
Written while students at the University of Denver College of Law.
2 9 Va. Law R. 376 (1922).
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By 1910 it was clearly established that a volunteer who acted
instinctively in an attempt to save a human life endangered by the
negligence of another could recover for injuries.3 The Wagner
case 4 extended this doctrine to cases of volitional and even delib-
erate conduct, so long as that conduct be not rash or reckless. In
that case, Justice Cordozo set forth the new and startling theory
that danger invites rescue. He further stated, "the wrong that
imperils life is a wrong to the imperiled victim; it is a wrong also
to his rescuer." The Wagner case 5 has been followed in many
jurisdictions, 6 and seems to be good law today, where the attempted
rescue is of a person and not property.
The situation in which this doctrine is applicable arises when
one, by his negligence, puts another in danger of being injured
or losing his life, and some third party attempts to rescue the
imperiled party. The recent case of Brugh v. Bigelow 7 has even
applied the rescue doctrine where the defendant placed himself
in peril and a passerby stopped and attempted to aid him. The
passerby, as plaintiff, recovered from the defendant for injuries
suffered in the attempted rescue. The court held for the plaintiff
even though the act of the defendant had to be held as negligence
toward himself. Thus it seems evident that there need be no duty
toward a known party; indeed, if the holding of the Brugh case be
followed, there need to no duty at all! This seems to be the
furthest extent to which the danger invites rescue doctrine could
be applied. Applying the reasoning of the above case, it would
appear that in any situation where a human life is in a perilous
position due to the negligence of the defendant, the party who is
injured while attempting to rescue the one imperiled may recover
for his injuries.
"LIMITATIONS"
The rescue doctrine, however, has its qualifications. First,
the danger must appear imminent and real, and not merely imag-
inary or speculative. The appearance of reality and imminence
must exist at the time the rescuer takes action. This is a matter
to be determined by the jury. It has been held 8 that the apparent
imminence of danger sufficient to induce a belief that action is
necessary and to impel an attempt to rescue the one supposedly
in peril is to be measured by the standard of reasonable care
under the circumstances, or the manner in which an ordinarily
prudent person would act in the same or similar circumstances.
3 Dixon v. N. Y., N. Haven & Hartford R. R., 207 Mass. 126, 92 N. E. 1030
(1910); Ridley v. Mobile and Ohio R. R., 114 Tenn. 727, 86 S. W. 606 (1905);
Eckert v. L. I. R. R., 43 N. Y. 502, 3 Am. Rep. 721 (1871); Corbin v. Philadelphia,
195 Pa. 461, 45 A. 1070 (1900).
'Wagner v. Inter'l R. R. Co., 232 N. Y. 176, 133 N. E. 437 (1921).
'Supra, n. 4.
See cases collected in 158 A. L. R. 189.
1310 Mich. 74, 16 N. W. 2d 668 (1944).
'Highland v. Wilsonian Inv. Co., 171 Wash. 34, 17 P. 2d 631 (1932); Wolf-
inger v. Shaw, 138 Neb. 229, 292 N. W. 731 (1940) ; Arnold v. Northern States
Power Co., 209 Minn. 551, 297 N. W. 182 (1941).
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Second, the dangerous condition must not have been brought about
by the rescuer. This qualification is, of course, obvious, for if one
could recover for a rescue attempt in a perilous situation created
by his own negligence, he would be, in effect, making another pay
for his own wrong. It is essential, in order to permit a recovery
upon the theory of rescue, to show that the negligence of the
defendant and not the rescuer was the proximate cause of injury
or death.9 It must be pointed out that the proximate cause men-
tioned here is proximate cause of the injury or death, and, con-
sequently, the perilous position of the party the rescuer, who is
now plaintiff, sought to aid. This further illustrates that no duty
was owing to the rescuer. The only legal duty owing at all was
from the tortfeasor to the imperiled party not to injure him. Once
that duty has been breached it is a breach as to anyone who be-
comes a rescuer.
Assuming a situation in which the rescue doctrine would
apply and a rescuer acts pursuant to the above qualifications,
the question now arises as to the manner of his acting. He must
not act rashly, recklessly or with wanton disregard for his own
safety.1 0 Whether or not the attempt to rescue was so rash as
to constitute contributory negligence was held in the Wagner case 11
to be a question for the jury.
AVAILABLE DEFENSES
The next problem to be faced is probably the most difficult
and lengthy in the rescue doctrine. This problem concerns the
defenses available to the negligent defendant. If he has not been
negligent, the answer is clear; there is no cause of action. If he
has been negligent, and we assume here that he has, the defendant's
most tenable defenses are: (1) contributory negligence of the
rescuer; (2) assumption of the risk by the rescuer. The rule that
one who sees a person in imminent and serious peril through the
negligence of another cannot be charged with contributory negli-
gence, as a matter of law, in risking his own life or serious injury
in attempting to effect a rescue, provided the attempt is not rashly
or recklessly made, is supported by many cases. 1 2 The risk of an
attempted rescue may be so great or the chance of its success so
slight as to make it unreasonable to attempt it even though a
human life is at stake; the less the danger to the third party, the
less the risk the plaintiff may reasonably encounter. This is the
view taken by the American Law Institute 13 and was followed
'Bacon v. Payne, 220 Mich. 672, 190 N. W. 716 (1922).
"OWright v. Atlantic R. R. Co., 110 Va. 670, 66 S. E. 848 (1910); Da Rin v.
Casualty Co. of Am., 41 Mont. 175, 108 P. 649 (1910).
" SuDra, n. 4.
'-Rovinski v. Rowe, 131 F. 2d 687 (C. C. C. 6th 1942) ; Roach v. L. A. and
Salt Lake R. R. Co., 74 Utah 545, 280 P. 1053 (1929) ; Christiansen v. L. A. &
Salt Lake R. R. Co., 77 Utah 85, 291 P. 926 (1930) ; Bernardine v. N. Y., 268
App. Div. 444, 51 N. Y. S. 2d 888 (1944) ; Walters v. Denver Cons. Elec. Light Co.,
12 Colo. App. 14, 54 P. 960 (1898).
"Restatement of Torts, sec. 472.
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in a 1940 Connecticut case. 14 The court therein stated that the
mere presence of danger creating a desire to save a person from
injury or death is not alone sufficient to justify application of the
rescue doctrine, for to venture life where there is no possibility
of saving or where the danger is not great or the possibility of
loss serious may go beyond the limit of that which is legally per-
missible.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
In order to invoke the rescue doctrine successfully and es-
tablish freedom from contributory negligence as a matter of law,
it is only necessary for the rescuer to show that he acted as a
reasonably prudent person 15 would have acted under the same or
similar circumstances. It appears the law itself makes allow-
ances, for the human instincts which prompt people to attempt
to aid others in danger spurs the law to widen the permissible
margin of error in judgment, requiring practically a certainty
of death or injury in order to render a rescuer guilty of con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law. The rescuer acting
with due care is almost certain to get his case before a jury.
The rescuer is looked on with favor by the courts. If he acts
prudently and the situation he enters was not so obviously incon-
sequential as to require his being precluded from proceeding, he will
surely get to the jury for consideration of his evidence. This
appears to be an exception to the ordinary rule of contributory
negligence, for this defense will avail a defendant nothing unless
certain definite circumstances appear-namely, that the rescuer
was rash or reckless. The law seems to offer a rescuer this protec-
tion due to his spirit of sacrifice. It must be remembered that this
exception is one of social policy, and it applies only where the defen-
dant's act brought about the situation, there was imminent peril to
a life, and the plaintiff acted.
In Brown v. Columbia Amusement Co., 6 the court stated the
general rule to be that a person who is injured in the rescue or
attempted rescue of another who has been placed in a perilous
situation by the negligence of a third party may recover from
that negligent person as though the negligence constituted a breach
of duty directly toward him, and that the presumption exists that
the rescuer was impelled by the dictates of humanity, which alone
are sufficient to send the plaintiff's case to the jury, unless it
should appear that the situation was so dangerous that he ought,
as a prudent man, to have known that'he could not escape injury
or death.
It can thus be seen how far courts will go to give aid to the
rescuer. In effect, these cases almost wipe out contributory negli-
gence as a defense, for rashness or recklessness must be shown to
avoid a recovery by the plaintiff. This is something more than
14 Cote v. Palmer, 127 Conn. 321, 16 A. 2d 595 (1940).
13Again it must be remembered that this is a jury question.
"1 91 Mont. 174, 6 P. 2d 874 (1931).
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negligence, and is apparently an exception to the usual rules of
contributory negligence. The case of Lolti v. Market St. Railway
Co.1 7 points this up very well. This case held specifically that
though the general rule is that one who is aware of danger and
neglects to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury is not per-
mitted to recover, there is a limitation, for example, where one
seeks to rescue another person from imminent peril.
"ASSUMPTION OF RISK"
The second defense is that of voluntary assumption of risk
by the plaintiff rescuer. The Wagner case Is seems to have been
the first to set up the principle that opportunity for deliberation
before the rescuer acts will not, as a matter of law, preclude
recovery on the theory of assumption of risk. This case has been
followed and cited by many courts, and the proposition involved
is good law today. Before this case, it had been held 19 that the
rescuer should act spontaneously and without chance to deliberate
as to a course of action. This departure from the past thus dis-
posed of what had formerly been an important consideration
(spontaneity) and went further than any previous case had gone.
A 1904 Texas case,20 discussing the problems of contributory neg-
ligence and assumption of risk together declared,
While it is true that one assumes the risk of injuries that
might result from a voluntary exposure to known dan-
gers, the same rule that would excuse him from the charge
of contributory negligence in the effort to save life would
relieve him from an application of the doctrine of as--
sumed risk. Of course he assumes the risk in the sense
that he voluntarily encounters peril, but if there is any
force or logic in the rule that would excuse one from
contributory negligence in the attempt to save life, we
see no reason why the same rule would not apply-in deny-
ing an application of the doctrine of assumed risk. Neither
contributory negligence nor assumption of risk will de-
feat a recovery where the party injured or killed risks
his life to save the life of another, under circumstances
showing that his conduct was not rash or reckless.
This case was decided even before the departure from the spon-
taneity test. If true then, surely it would be doubly true when,
as now, even deliberation will not set up assumption of risk as
a preclusion of recovery as a matter of law.
It appears that if the rescuer is in apprehension of real danger
to the third party and acts not rashly or recklessly, in other words,
does not enter a hopeless situation, the chances of a successful
17 43 Calif. App. 2d 166, 110 P. 2d 436 (1941).
Supra, n. 4.
19 Eckert v. L. I. R. R. Co., 43 N. Y. 502, 3 Am. Rep. 721 (1871); Central
R. R. v. Crosby, 74 Ga. 737 (1885); Linnehan v. Sampson, 126 Mass. 506 (1879).
20International & Gr. Northern R. R. Co. v. McVey, Tex. Civ. App., 81 S.
W. 991 (1904). This case seems to be good law today. It was, however, reversed
on the question of excessive damages.
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defense are almost nil. This rule is founded on social policy and
tends to encourage persons to aid others in danger. True, no en-
couragement is needed where the act is spontaneous, for one
doesn't stop to think over the pros and cons of acting. It does,
however, practically abrogate the assumption of risk defense where
one thinks over his act and then enters the situation to aid an-
other. The law there offers aid to those who seek to effect a
rescue.
Though this doctrine of danger inviting rescue was much
discussed immediately after the Wagner case, 21 it has become a
well settled principle and is universally followed. It is the child
of this society, and exists to promote harmony and cooperation
among persons. The writers submit that it is a healthy rule, and
one which may lead into more and more law based on social policy,
law made by courts and not legislatures. The law that danger
invites rescue, "made" by Justice Cardozo in the Wagner case,
22
has effected a great change in the legal view of negligence and
breaches of duty. This doctrine has extended the duty of due care
in one's actions. If one places another in peril, his duty to the
world has not ceased. He is liable to anyone who is injured in
attempting to effect a rescue, while, of course, not acting rashly
or recklessly. As an example, if X by his negligence in operation
of his automobile injures another and places him in peril, X's
negligence continues until rescue is effected. He is liable to any
rescuer who acts with reason, that is, in apprehension of real and
imminent danger to the imperiled party, and whose conduct is not
rash, reckless or in wanton disregard for his own safety. The
writers submit that the rescue doctrine places responsibility for
the consequences of a choice made by the plaintiff upon the one
(the defendant) who put him (the plaintiff) in the dilemma of
choosing between safety for himself or aid to a fellow man.
The implications of Brugh v. Bigelow 23 are tremendous in
scope, for that case makes a party responsible to any rescuer, even
where that party places only himself in peril. In that case the
driver of an automobile, through his own careless or negligent
driving, placed himself in peril. The plaintiff attempted to aid
upon hearing the driver's plea for help. In effecting the rescue,
the plaintiff was injured. The defendant's contention, that there
could be no negligence since he owed himself no duty not to injure
himself, was rejected. The court, in rejecting this argument,
stated, "We can make no such distinction of duty in defining the
duties of drivers of automobiles on the highways of this state ...
Defendant's claim that he owed himself and his rescuer no duty
is without merit. His cries for help belied his claimed freedom
from duty.2 4" This case, decided as recently as 1944, is the furthest
the rescue doctrine has been extended.
.Supra, n. 4.
Supra, n. 4.
23 Supra, n. 7.
24 Supra, n. 7.
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